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Today, I wish I was representing a mythical state like Mediana. The
advantage of representing mythical states is that there are no instructions
from headquarters and you can have your flights of fancy. I am afraid I
have a point of view which is different from that expressed yesterday here
when U.S. citizens were analyzing U.S. attitudes towards the United Nations.
In listening to the discussions yesterday, what struck me most was that,
while discussing the United Nations, nobody mentioned the idea of a World
Government. Nobody mentioned idealism. This struck me very strongly
because, if you ask an average Indian as to what the United Nations is, he
will say that it is the nucleus of a World Government, or the beginning of
One World. That, I think, is the difference between a superpower trying to
look at the U.N. as an instrument of its policy, and another country looking
at it as a family of nations. Perhaps this is inherent in Indian thinking
because we have been visualizing One World for centuries. We look at the
United Nations as the beginning of democratization of international relations.
We, therefore, tend to overlook some of its deficiencies. We are not
particularly disappointed if it does not succeed in one area or another. The
fact that it is there is reason for hope even if it is not as effective as it
should be.
The United Nations has been a reality for us all these years, all these fifty
years. It has been doing useful work. The General Assembly has formulat-
ed consensus documents of far reaching significance on decolonization,
economic issues, social matters, and human rights. It is not as though the
U.N. has come to life only after the Cold War.
Did the United Nations achieve its objective of saving the future
generations from a third world war? That is a question that we can discuss
forever and we may not find an answer. I must tell you an interesting story
to illustrate the point.
There was an old man walking around in Manhattan spreading some white
powder on First Avenue. Intrigued by this, someone walked up to him and
asked him what he was doing. He said that he was spreading lion powder
to keep lions out of Manhattan. When he was told that there were no lions
in Manhattan, he said, "You see, my powder is effective. It is because I
have been spreading this powder on First Avenue for the last several years
that lions keep away from Manhattan."
* Deputy Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations.
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
Similarly, the U.N. can claim that it was because of the hundreds of
resolutions that were adopted by the United Nations, it was because of the
speeches that were made at the U.N. that there was no third world war. Just
as it cannot be proved whether the lion powder was effective or not, no one
can say whether the U.N. prevented a world war or not. Perhaps the work
done by the United Nations over a long period, the time, energy and
resources spent on it, may have been the reason for the absence of a third
world war.
Talking about global attitudes to the U.N., I must say that a country like
India is not seeking anything from the United Nations. Perhaps, you would
find this a surprising statement. When a country joins the United Nations,
is it not seeking something from it? Is there not something you want from
it? The answer is "no" in the case of India. Apart from the expectation that
the United Nations will do some good for the world one day, India is not
looking for benefits for itself from the U.N. Ironically, however, India was
one of the countries that went to the Security Council soon after its
independence. I am talking about 1948, when India went to complain to the
Security Council that Pakistan had committed aggression against India. India
went to the United Nations not because we could not resolve the problem
ourselves. If India had not gone to the United Nations at that time, the
Indian army would have thrown the aggressor out of Kashmir in a few
hours. It was India's idealism, it was the feeling that the new world
organization should resolve conflicts and disputes, that prompted India to go
to the Security Council. Similarly, when we speak of a just international
economic order, when we ask for new and additional resources for
environmental protection, I do not think that we are seeking assistance for
ourselves. What we are seeking to do is to pursue a kind of dream, a dream
for a better world.
The contribution that the United Nations has made in the areas of
decolonization, disarmament, and development even before the end of the
Cold War has been great, and even if it has not been very successful in the
settlement of disputes all around the globe, its contribution in other areas is
widely recognized and understood and our attitude towards the United
Nations is determined by that perception.
Now let us come to the new United Nations. I have had two stints at the
United Nations. One was in the early 1980s at the height of the Cold War,
and the other began in 1992. I think these are two distinct phases in the
history of the United Nations. We belong to that group of countries which
believes that what happened soon after the Cold War was an exceptional
situation that required an exceptional approach.
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The U.N. Charter has never stood in the way of what the members have
wanted to do. The word "peacekeeping" does not figure in the Charter, just
as there is no "peacemaking," and there is no "preventive diplomacy."
Somebody said that the Charter was so magnificent and so unique, that it
was not written by human hands. No international action, however
innovative, has been prevented by the limitations of the Charter.
Where does the Charter talk about internal disputes? Yet, where has it
prevented the United Nations from going into situations of internal disaster?
Therefore, obviously the Charter is flexible enough, and it is comprehensive
enough, to allow innovative interpretations.
In the process, however, the Security Council and the United Nations as
a whole have eroded something which is considered extremely important by
its member states, which is sovereignty. One thing that is dear to every
member of the United Nations, whether it is a small state or a big state, is
respect for its sovereignty. In fact, some of the smaller states joined the
United Nations simply to safeguard their sovereignty, as against their
stronger and bigger neighbors or as against others who might want to
swallow them up. So, if you join the United Nations as a member in order
to safeguard your security, your identity, and your aspirations, how can you
accept erosion of sovereignty by the United Nations? We may have
acquiesced in, and we may have accepted a U.N. role in a situation where
there is an internal dispute. But the fact that the United Nations has no role
in internal affairs of states, and that it should not trample upon the sover-
eignty of individual states, is something which is very dear to every member
of the U.N. What you do not accept for yourself, you should not impose on
others. In some exceptional situations, we may have permitted the U.N. to
act in internal situations, but this should be seen more as an exception rather
than the rule.
We simply have to read the two Agendas for Peace that the Secretary-
General has put forward to see how he himself is trying to correct the
aberrations and bring the activities of the U.N. closer to the dictates of the
Charter. There is a basic difference between the approaches of these two
documents. Perhaps the first document was a creation of a group of people
at a time when the Secretary-General had not himself gained much
experience, while the second document is the essence of his experience in
the last three years or so, tempered by the realities of the situation. It has
the stamp of a person who has lived through these changes and these
aberrations and wishes to approach them with a realistic, and a more rational
mind.
1996]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
The most important point that we have noticed in the Agenda for Peace
II, as we have come to call it, is that the Secretary-General has virtually
returned to the precepts of the Charter. He has started treating the changes,
the modifications, and the alterations as consequences of the dictates of the
situation. This is what we welcome. For example, when Agenda for Peace
II speaks of peacekeeping operations it makes clear that you need the
consent of the parties concerned for peacekeeping. You need to realize that
there is a difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The
blurring of these two concepts, or keeping these as two aspects of the same
"continuum" has not been right. These are two independent, individual,
separate operations which must be done in accordance with the scheme of
the Charter for peaceful settlement of disputes. The use of force has to be
resorted to only in exceptional circumstances.
In short, we would favor a return to the fundamental precepts of the
Charter, the respect for sovereignty and consent of the parties concerned
even for humanitarian activities. Let us not forget the words in Chapter VI
which say, "all other methods freely chosen by the states themselves." It is
not important and it is not necessary for the U.N. to intervene in everything.
It is not compulsory, it is not obligatory. If two states are willing to resolve
their problems by bilateral means, there is no need for the U.N. to intervene.
It is not necessary. Leave it to them; let them decide.
This is the kind of vision that we have-of bilateral efforts, regional
efforts, and the U.N. as a last resort when everything else fails. The United
Nations does not have the resources to start interfering in every little war in
every corner of the world. It is not expected to; it ought to be there only
when it becomes necessary and other means fail.
I might touch upon just two more points which you have partly discussed
yesterday and even today. One is sanctions. No one doubts that sanctions
are a means of settling problems. Sanctions are useful instruments.
Somebody has called them blunt instruments, but indeed they are instru-
ments. If you look at the history of sanctions, you will see that it was the
developing world, the nonaligned countries, who advocated sanctions in the
case of South Africa. The General Assembly had several resolutions calling
for the imposition of sanctions against South Africa. It is interesting to
remember that, at that time, the bigger powers said that if sanctions were
imposed against South Africa, it would have some unintended victims.
"Yes, we hate apartheid, of course, but we will do nothing against South
Africa, because it will have adverse implications for unintended victims of
sanctions," we were told.
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This is a point that the Secretary-General makes in his Agenda for Peace
II. He makes the point that sanctions are useful in certain circumstances, but
we should think about the implications of the sanctions both for the errant
state as well as for its neighbors. India voted for Resolution 687, the
resolution which extended sanctions against Iraq. The difficulties arose in
Resolution 661 when the sanctions were first imposed against Iraq, because
the resolution set as its objective not just the "liberation of Kuwait," but
"restoration of international peace and security in the region." Thus, the
Security Council arrogated to itself the right to continue its sanctions as long
as it wished.
This kind of a broad mandate, which was given by the Security Council
to continue sanctions against Iraq, has created the present impasse in which
one does not know when these sanctions will end or even be relaxed. It may
be better than war. But the difference is that a war cannot continue
indefinitely, while sanctions can continue indefinitely like in the case of Iraq.
Is it fair for the U.N. to be criticized that it has some blood of innocent
children of Iraq on its hands? Sanctions have to be clinically applied to a
certain situation. It should also be considered as to what implications such
sanctions would have for the unintended victims that are affected. This is
where Article 50 of the Charter comes in. Article 50, in fact, anticipated all
of these problems. Hats off to the framers of the Charter. They acknow-
ledged that when the Security Council imposed sanctions against one
country, there could be adverse effects on certain other countries. Hence,
those countries have the "right" (that was the word used) to consult the
Security Council with a view to resolving their problems. In actual practice,
however, Article 50 has had no effect. It has offered no compensation for
the unintended victims of sanctions.
I myself chaired a Working Group of the Security Council on Article 50
and I am ashamed of the document we have issued because it simply says
that the Member States must explore various possibilities without even
acknowledging the fact that the Security Council has a responsibility and the
affected member states have a right to seek redress. Imagine, you have the
right to go to the Security Council, but the Security Council has no
obligation to do anything! We are still struggling with this particular
responsibility of the Security Council, to have some kind of a mechanism
which would come into play automatically as soon as sanctions are enforced.
Our point is that the sanctions resolution should have within it a
mechanism which would remove the difficulties of the neighboring countries
who might suffer. India, for example, lost something like $4 billion in lost
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contracts when we implemented the sanctions against Iraq. We. submitted
documentary evidence to the Security Council, but, as of today, we have not
yet received a penny out of it. As a law abiding state, if you abide by the
decisions of the Security Council you also ought to have the right to be
insulated against these problems. I think that only if that is done will the
Security Council be able to make decisions which will be respected by the
rest of the international community.
The last point that I would like to touch upon is the expansion of the
Security Council. I must have given you the impression that India is fairly
happy with the Charter and that there is no change necessary. The change
we are seeking in the size and composition of the Council is very much in
keeping with the provisions of the Charter. First of all, the Charter itself
provides for amendments and changes, and the strength of the Security
Council has already been changed once from eleven to fifteen.
The starting point of any expansion of the Security Council should be the
proportion between the general membership and size of the Security Council.
We had 11 as against 50, and then we had 15 as against less than 100, and
now, by a simple mathematical calculation we have to determine how many
out of 185 should be in the Council. We are not asking for a revolution, we
are simply asking that the original proportion should be maintained. One
may say that the Council will be too unwieldy if it is expanded beyond a
point. But I do not think that efficiency has anything to do with numbers.
The Security Council was very small, 11 to 15, during the Cold War. But
was it efficient then? How did it become efficient soon after the Cold War?
If you want the Security Council to be efficient, what you need is political
will. Just because a room is smaller, or the people are fewer, there will not
be greater efficiency there. In fact, the efficiency will increase if the Council
is a more representative group whose decisions carry credibility and the
moral authority of the entire membership of the U.N.
The formula can vary, people can argue whether they should be perma-
nent, non-permanent, semi-permanent, rotating, or even standing, as
recommended by the Global Governance Commission. Clearly, there is a
need for an expansion of the Security Council to make it representative, and
the question is, how do we do it? We feel that the permanent membership
should itself expand. It is not simply a question of members being able to
participate in the discussions, or simply witnessing them. All of us know




The developing countries cannot play an effective role in the Security
Council unless they are represented in the permanent membership. What we
are seeking is not simply a ringside seat; what we are seeking is the ability
to play a role in the Security Council, and this can be done only if the
developing world is adequately represented in the Security Council. If the
Security Council is to gain the moral authority that I mentioned earlier, the
nonaligned countries ought to be represented in the permanent membership
with equal rights and obligations, including the obligation to make a higher
financial contribution. The important point is that if we want to change the
complexion of the Security Council and its decision-making process, we
ought to have nonaligned countries as permanent members of the Security
Council.
How do we do that? The only way to do that is by developing universal
criteria for permanent membership. All of us know that there are criteria for
non-permanent membership in the Security Council, but there are no criteria
for permanent membership. It is time to consider what the attributes of a
permanent member are. I would say that population is an important factor.
The Charter says in the Preamble "We the people of the United Nations."
If it is not just a rhetorical flourish, how do you exclude one billion people
who represent a whole civilization from permanent membership?
Another criterion should be the record of a country's contribution to
peacekeeping operations. What is India's interest in participating in the
operation in Congo, or in Haiti, or in Somalia? Obviously, we believe that
the United Nations has a role there and since the Security Council has taken
a decision to send an operation there, we ought to help. There was a
reference made to payments, but I do not think that half the population of
India knows that India is being paid for peacekeeping operations, but the
entire country supports its involvement in peacekeeping operations.
India has the tragic distinction of having lost the largest number of
soldiers in peacekeeping operations. We have lost something like 88
soldiers. There was no protest over such a tragedy because it was seen as
much our patriotic duty to serve the United Nations as to serve the nation
itself. A country like India which has participated in most peacekeeping
operations, risking lives, should qualify to serve as a permanent member of
the Security Council. Economic power alone should not be the criterion for
permanent membership.
A reference was made yesterday to a general agreement about Germany
and Japan joining as additional permanent members. I challenge that
conclusion: there is no such general agreement. There is general talk, yes,
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but the Japanese themselves have told us that they do not have more than
thirty supporters. Even those supporters do not simply say, "Japan full
stop," or "Germany full stop." No, they say, "We support Germany and
Japan together with others." I have no quarrel with the claims of Japan and
Germany. However, let those claims, and other claims of anybody else, be
tested against universal criteria that should be agreed upon. I know that this
will take time, this may not be a reality this year, or the next few years, but
we can wait. The Security Council is not stuck somewhere, it is operating,
it is functioning. So, it is not that we need to have a quick fix to make it
run. Any expansion has to be done in a logical and coherent way so that it
is satisfactory to all the countries.
I shall conclude by saying that India feels that the Charter has served
humanity well, and it has been flexible enough to allow innovative
interpretations. While there have been aberrations, we feel that the sooner
we get back to the Charter and look at the world from the perspective of the
Charter, the better. Improvements that can be brought about through open,
transparent discussions should be brought about to make it even more
effective. Thank you very much.
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